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ACCESS DENIED:
A CASE COMMENT ON
MATIMAK TRADING Co. V. KHALILY
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued a decision that may have dramatically altered the relationship
between the United States and Hong Kong. In Matimak Trading Co. v.
Khalily, I the Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the Southern District
of New York2 dismissing a breach of contract claim by a Hong Kong
corporation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' The Court of Appeals
agreed with the opinion of the District Court which found that, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) ("§ 1332"), a Hong Kong corporation cannot
invoke alienage jurisdiction against two New YoFk corporations. 4 In a 2-1
decision, the Court of Appeals concluded that, according to principles of
international law, Hong Kong was stateless.' Therefore, Matimak Trading
Co. could not be a citizen or subject of a foreign state which is required to
invoke alienage jurisdiction. 6 The Court, in its formalistic analysis,
deferred to the power of the executive branch to officially recognize foreign
states, 7 evaluated the rationales underlying alienage jurisdiction and the
intent of the framers of § 1332,8 and examined the relationship between
Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. 9 Judge Altimari's dissenting opinion
stated that the failure to recognize Hong Kong as a foreign state was
contrary to the purposes of alienage jurisdiction.' ° The dissent analyzed the

1. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997).
2. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

3. Id.
at 151.
4. Id.at 152; see Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 82.

5. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d 76.
6. Id. at 86.
7. Id. at 79-83.
8. Id. at 86-87.
9. Id.
at 85-86.
10. Id.at 88.
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intent of the framers in granting alienage jurisdiction to the federal courts
in the Constitution and the current position of Hong Kong in the
international community. Judge Altimari recognized the importance of
Hong Kong as an autonomous force, especially in the world economy.1 2 He
concluded that, based upon the Constitution, statutes, and policy, adequate
grounds existed for granting alienage jurisdiction to Matimak Trading
Company. 13
This comment argues that the majority in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit erred in denying alienage jurisdiction to Matimak Trading
Company. The purpose of the constitutional grant of alienage jurisdiction
was to provide a neutral forum for resolving disputes between United States
citizens and foreign citizens without antagonizing foreign nations.' 4 Since
the denial of alienage jurisdiction leaves Hong Kong corporations without
an adequate forum in which to resolve disputes with American trading
partners, the Court's holding is contrary to the purposes of alienage
jurisdiction under § 1332. 15 Additionally, several other reasons exist which
justify a grant of alienage jurisdiction.' 6 First, granting such jurisdiction
would have been appropriate because it would have recognized Hong Kong
as sovereign with respect to alienage jurisdiction only, based upon its
commercial relationship with the United States. "7 Second, it would have
been proper because of Hong Kong's colonial relationship with the
sovereign United Kingdom or as part of China after July 1, 1997.18 The
majority in the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the important political
and economic consequences for Hong Kong corporations that were created
by denying alienage jurisdiction.' 9 Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily places
Hong Kong corporations on unequal footing in their trade dealings with
American corporations. 20 One consequence of this is the perception of

11. Id. at 89-92.
12. Id. at 88, 90-91.
13. Id. at 90, 92.
14. Id. at 88; see generally Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction?Historical
Foundations and Modern Justificationsfor Federaljurisdiction over Disputes Involving
Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1 (1996).
15. Id. at 88-89; see Johnson, supra note 14, at 45-46, 48 (implying that state courts are
not adequate to adjudicate claims made by foreign businesses against United States citizens).
16. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88-92.
17. Id. at 92.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 88-92.
20. Id. at 88.
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unfair treatment by Hong Kong corporations. E' Such corporations could
retaliate against American corporations or become hesitant in trade
dealings, resulting in a loss of trade for the United States.22 Matimak
Trading Co. v. Khalily left little hope for any change in the position of
Hong Kong corporations.2 3 The Court relied on portions of the U.S.-Hong
Kong Policy Act of 199224 which states that United States relations with
Hong Kong will remain the same following its return to China on July 1,
1997.25 The Court interpreted these sections to support the notion that
Hong Kong would continue to remain stateless after its return to Chinese
rule.26 It is this author's opinion that this interpretation of the Policy Act
only magnifies the Court's unfair treatment of Hong Kong.

H. THE FACTS
Under § 1332(a)(2), federal courts have jurisdiction over any civil
action that arises between "citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state." 27 Matimak Trading Co. Ltd., a corporation formed under
the laws of Hong Kong with its principal place of business in Wanchai,
Hong Kong, 28 sued Albert Khalily and D.A.Y. Kids Sportswear Inc. in the
Southern District of New York under § 1332(a)(2). 29 The dispute was
originally brought for a breach of contract. 30 However, before the district
court reached the merits of the case, the Judge raised the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte.3 '
In its submission to the District Court, Matimak Trading Co.
("Matimak") argued that the Court should grant alienage jurisdiction based
upon recognition of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state.3 2 Matimak
relied primarily upon precedent in which other states were granted alienage
jurisdiction in the absence of formal recognition by the executive branch as

21. See generally Johnson, supra note 14, at 48-49.
22. Id. at 49.
23. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 81.
24. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732 (1994).
25. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 81.
26. Id. at 81-82
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994).
28. Matimak Trading Co., 936 F. Supp. at 152.
29. Id.
30. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 78.
31. Matimak Trading Co., 936 F. Supp. at 152.
32. Id.
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Matimak also relied on a letter from the State

Department which urged the Court to recognize Hong Kong as a de facto
foreign state because of Hong Kong's trade relationship with the United
States.34 The District Court rejected these arguments and based its opinion
on deference to the executive branch of government."
The Court
determined that it was the duty of the executive branch, not the role of the
court, to recognize a foreign state.36 However, even though the Court
attributed the role of recognizing foreign states to the executive branch, it
refused to accept the letter by the State Department as evidence of de facto
recognition by the executive branch. 37 Instead, the Court attempted to
support its decision by relying on a different letter, submitted by the State
Department in another case, providing that the United States did not
recognize Hong Kong as sovereign. 38 However, the Court does not indicate
whether the second letter it relied on was to be used for the purposes of
determining alienage jurisdiction in the other case. 39 Significantly, the
letter submitted by Matimak requested the Court to recognize de facto
sovereignty of Hong Kong only for the purpose of granting alienage
jurisdiction to Hong Kong corporations.'
In evaluating the policy
considerations that were asserted in the letter submitted on Matimak's
behalf, the Court found that the strong economical ties between the United
States and Hong Kong were insufficient to establish de facto recognition by
the United States government."1
In finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court reviewed and
considered precedent in which other states were granted alienage
jurisdiction even though not formally recognized by the executive branch.42
The Court found the precedent unpersuasive or irrelevant because the case
holdings were supported by policy considerations that the Court was
unwilling to accept. 43 Even if policy arguments were accepted in prior
cases, the District Court rejected them to avoid a judicial, rather than
33. Id. at 152-53.
34. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 81.
35. Id. at 82-87.
36. Matimak Trading Co., 936 F. Supp. at 152.
37. id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 81-82.
Id. at 81.
Matimak Trading Co., 936 F. Supp. at 152.
Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 84-86.

43. Matimak Trading Co., 936 F. Supp. at 152-53.
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executive, grant of recognition as a de facto sovereign state to Hong
Kong. 44 The Court distinguished Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily from
Murarka v. Bachrack Bros. to demonstrate that a formal recognition of
Hong Kong's sovereignty, unlike India's, 45 was not imminent because the
United States had not taken substantial steps toward recognizing Hong Kong
as an integrated part of China.46 In Murarka, the Second Circuit recognized
India as a de facto sovereign state solely for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction shortly before it was formally recognized by the United States.47
The District Court stated that since Hong Kong had not been incorporated
into China when the suit was commenced, the Court could not use it as a
basis for granting Hong Kong corporations alienage jurisdiction.4"
When Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily reached the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court posed three primary questions
to be answered.49 First, whether Hong Kong was a foreign state so that
Matimak was a "citizen or subject of a foreign state." 5" Second, whether
Matimak was a citizen or subject of the United Kingdom as a result of Hong
Kong's colonial status at the time the suit was brought.5 Third, whether
all non-citizens of the United States may invoke alienage jurisdiction against
United States citizens.5" The Court resolved each of these questions in the
negative, reasoning: (1) Hong Kong was not recognized as a sovereign
state; (2) Hong Kong was not considered fully integrated into the United
Kingdom; and (3) a non-citizen of the United States who is stateless, like
the citizens of Hong Kong, cannot invoke alienage jurisdiction.53 In
resolving the first issue, the Court analyzed generally accepted definitions
of a state according to precedent and notions of international law, 54
principles of de facto recognition, 5 and the rationales underlying alienage
jurisdiction. 6 The Court of Appeals deferred to the executive branch in
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
46.
47.
48.
49.

Matimak Trading Co., 936
Murarka, 251 F.2d at 552,
Matimak Trading Co., 936
Matimak Trading Co., 118

F. Supp. at 153.
see also Matimak Trading Co., 936 F. Supp. at 152.
F. Supp. at 152.
F.3d at 76, 79.

50. Id. at 79; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994).
51. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 79.
52. Id. at 79.
53. Id. at 82, 86-87.
54. Id. at 79-80.

55. Id. at 80-82.
56. Id. at 82-83.
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determining who was a foreign state.5 7 With respect to resolving the second
issue, the Court sought to determine whether the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom was applicable to Hong Kong. 5 This was done by examining the
British laws governing Hong Kong.5 9 Finally, in resolving the third issue,
the Court examined the intent of the framers of the Constitution in granting
alienage jurisdiction.' The Court concluded that the framers' assumption
that every non-citizen of the United States is a citizen of a foreign state is
no longer valid because of international law notions of statelessness. 6'

M.

THE PRECEDENT

A. Statutory Origins
1. Alienage Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
Federal courts are granted the power to hear and decide cases involving
aliens under Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution62 and § 1332.63
Although slightly different,' the essential purpose of the two grants of
alienage jurisdiction is to give United States courts the power to settle
disputes between citizens of the United States and citizens of foreign

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 79, 81-83.
Id. at 85-86.
Id.
Id.at 86-88.
Id.at 87.
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 which provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their authority; to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies between two or
more States; between a State and Citizens of different States; between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens,
or Subjects.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994). This states that "(a) The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(2) citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state."
64. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). The grant of
alienage jurisdiction under the United States Constitution is much broader than that
contained in § 1332(a)(2).
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states.65 In his dissent, Judge Altimari indicates that the purpose of alienage
jurisdiction must be analyzed in order to determine its proper application.'
The majority67 analyzed the framers intent in reaction to Judge Altimari's
analysis of the intent of the framers. 6" However, the majority reached a
very different conclusion.69 Although there is considerable debate over the
proper application of alienage jurisdiction, several purposes have been
identified.70
First, alienage jurisdiction was intended to provide a neutral forum for
adjudicating disputes between citizens of the United States and citizens of
foreign nations. 7 ' An important consideration of the framers was to create
a neutral forum free from bias in order to avoid conflicts with foreign
nations.7 2 The prevailing notion, which still exists today, is that state courts
are more prone to bias.73 Scholars have noted that as a result of this bias,

foreign corporations receive a greater amount of unfair treatment in our
nation's state courts.74 Additionally, foreign corporations find it difficult
to litigate trade disputes when required to adjudicate their claims in state
courts75 because they must contend with the different procedural rules in
each of the fifty states.76

65. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 89; Johnson, supra note 14, at 6; Christine
Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and Alienage Jurisdictionin
Light of Abu-Zeineh v. FederalLaboratories,Inc., 11 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 195,
207-08 (1996).
66. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88-89.
67. Id. at 82-83.
68. Id. at 88-89 (relying on Hong Kong Deposit and Guar. Co. Ltd. v. Hibdon, 602 F.
Supp. 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), Judge Altimari determined that the purposes of alienage
jurisdiction were to provide a neutral forum, avoid entanglements with foreign nations, and
avoid the appearance of injustice in United States relations with foreign nations. Id. at 88).
69. Id. at 83, 89.
70. See generally Johnson, supra note 14, at 6, 26-27; Biancheria, supra note 65, at
207-08; Hong Kong Deposit and Guar. Co. Ltd., 602 F. Supp. at 1383.
71. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88; Hong Kong Deposit and Guar. Co. Ltd., 602
F. Supp. at 1383; see Johnson, supra note 14, at 6, 15, 31, 48.
72. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 87-88; Hong Kong Deposit and Guar. Co. Ltd.,
602 F. Supp. at 1383; Johnson, supra note 14, at 26-27, 33, 49; Biancheria, supra note 65,
at 207-08.
73. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 6, 46, 48.
74. See id. at 46.
75. See id. at 48.
76. See id.
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The foreign policy implications of disputes with foreign citizens were
a second purpose for conferring alienage jurisdiction on the federal courts."
The framers were concerned that cases involving non-citizens of the United
States would have consequences that affect the entire nation.78 Therefore,
it was important to provide a national forum for adjudicating claims
involving foreign citizens.7 9 This was especially true of cases involving
international commerce.8" The framers thought that a national, rather than
state, forum for resolving commercial disputes would foster international
commerce, which was a critical component in the development of a young
nation. 8 ' Even though the primary concern was resolving trade disputes
with British companies after the American Revolution, the principle holds
true today. 82 It is not a secret that modern society is growing ever more
interdependent, particularly in the area of international trade. 83 The
realities of economic and political interdependence mean that the United
States cannot act without first considering the implications for the rest of the
world. 4 This is what the Second Circuit failed to do when it denied
alienage jurisdiction to Matimak.85
The Court analyzed the intent of the framers in granting alienage
jurisdiction in order to interpret who is included under the term "citizen or
subject of a foreign state '8 6 and to justify deference to the executive
branch.87 First, the Court's interpretation dismissed the intent of the
framers by stating that the framers did not contemplate statelessness.8 8
Therefore, their intent does not apply in modern society. 8 9 The Court also
rejected the dissent's argument that the framers intended every non-citizen
of the United States to be a citizen or subject of a foreign state for purposes
of alienage jurisdiction. 9 Instead, the Court relied on the notion of

77. See id. at 11 (relying on THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton)).
78. Id.at 11.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 13.
81. Id.
82. See id.at 13, 48-49.
83. See id. at 48-49; Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1997).
84. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 48-49; Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88.
85. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 79-88.
86. Id. at 86-88.
87. Id. at 83.
88. Id. at 87.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 86-89.
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statelessness derived from international law. 9' Second, while agreeing that
access to a neutral forum avoids entanglements with foreign nations which
is a central purpose of alienage jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless employed
the notion of statelessness to justify a policy of deference to the executive
branch.92 The Court reasoned that if the executive branch does not formally
recognize a foreign entity as sovereign, there is no state to become
entangled with.93 This analysis ignores the fact that Hong Kong is a foreign

entity despite its lack of sovereignty, and that a denial of access to the
federal courts creates conflict not only with Hong Kong but also the United
Kingdom and China.' Hong Kong has the power to retaliate against the
United States.95 The Court was correct in relying on international law
notions because they are important sources of law which assist in resolving
international disputes. However, the Court should not have given these
notions precedence over the United States Constitution.96
2. The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992
As a result of the Sino-British Joint Declaration which provided for
the transfer of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China on July 1,
1997, Congress enacted the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 ("Policy
Act") to govern future United States relations with Hong Kong. 9' The
Court of Appeals interpreted this Policy Act as supportive of its notion that
the United States would not recognize Hong Kong as sovereign. 9" The
Court reasoned that the Policy Act called for relations between the United
States and Hong Kong to remain the same after July 1997, and therefore,
Hong Kong would still not be recognized as a fully autonomous state. 99

91. Id. at 87.

92. Id. at 83.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 88.
95. Id. at 81-82, 90-92. This author finds that the Court's discussion on the status of

Hong Kong shows its importance to the U.S. economy, and that any retaliation against
unfairness could cause the U.S. serious economic damage.
96. Biancheria, supra note 65, at 199-203 (discussing the use of international law in
federal policy).
97. 22 U.S.C. § 5701 (1994).
98. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 82.

99. Id. at 76, 81-82.
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Several sections of the Policy Act recognize Hong Kong as fully
autonomous from both the United Kingdom and China.t °° The Policy Act
itself recognizes the important status of Hong Kong as an international
financial and economic center."'o It indicates that the United States will
continue to treat Hong Kong as its own distinct legal entity in all areas
where Hong Kong is granted autonomy by China."o The only areas where
China retains full control over Hong Kong is in foreign and defense
affairs. 103 The Policy Act simply clarifies the relationship between the
United States and Hong Kong and it should, at least, be regarded as some
proof that the United States recognizes Hong Kong as either autonomous or
part of a sovereign state.
B. Policy Basis

1. Defining a State
The definition of a foreign state for purposes of alienage jurisdiction
is not found in either the constitutional grant of alienage jurisdiction
contained in Article III or in § 1332(a)(2). 105 Consequently, the Court of
Appeals analyzed the principles established in this Court and general
principles of international law in order to determine what constitutes a state
for purposes of alienage jurisdiction."6 First, the Second Circuit relied on
precedent which defined a "state" as a foreign entity that the executive
branch has formally recognized as a state. 1o Second, the Court looked at
100. See 22 U.S.C. § 5712(3) (1994) which provides that "The United States should
respect Hong Kong's status as a separate customs territory"; 22 U.S.C. § 5713(3) (1994)
stating that "The United States should continue to recognize Hong Kong as a territory which
is fully autonomous from the United Kingdom and, after June 30, 1997, should treat Hong
Kong as a territory fully autonomous from the peoples Republic of China with respect to
economic and trade matters"; 22 U.S.C. § 5722(a) (1994) which allows the President to
suspend the laws of the United States with respect to Hong Kong if the President

"determines that Hong Kong is not sufficiently autonomous to justify treatment under a
particular law of the United States."
101. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701(1)(E),(4), 5711(1).
102. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 84 n.2.
103. See Shawn B. Jensen, InternationalAgreementsBetween the United States and Hong
Kong Under the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act, 7 TEMP. INT'L. & COMP. L. J. 167

(1993).
104. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 90.

105. Id. at 79.
106. Id. at 79-80.
107. Id. at 79 (quoting from Iran Handicraft Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Int'l Corp.,
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interpretations of what a state is in international law. 108 The Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law, § 201, defines a state as one that has
a defined territory and under the control of its own government.' °9 While
the Court in Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily relies primarily on deference
to the executive branch to reject Matimak's claims, the Court used this
definition to find that Hong Kong did not qualify as a state. "0
2. Separation of Powers
The United States Constitution separates the powers of the federal
government among three branches: the Executive, Legislature, and the
Judiciary."'l Each branch of government has carefully proscribed duties
and powers that should not be infringed upon unless specifically provided
for in the Constitution." 2 Historically, the Judiciary has recognized the
power of the executive branch to recognize foreign states. "3 The courts use
two reasons to justify their deference to the executive branch. '14 First,
Article II of the Constitution grants the President the power to appoint and
receive ambassadors. "' The Courts have inferred that these powers,
combined with the President's role in international relations, result in the
power of the executive branch to recognize foreign states. " 6 Second, as the
Court in Matimak agrees, the Judiciary does not have the competency to
judge executive decisions on recognition." 7 However, this policy only
applies to formal recognition of a foreign entity as a state." 8 The Court in
655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988)).
108. Id. at 80.

109. RESTATEMENT
§ 201 (1987).

(THRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

110. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 80.
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III.
113. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 80; Iran Handicraft Carpet Export Ctr. v.
Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988);
See also Edwin L. Fountain, Note, Out From the Precarious Orbit of Politics:
ReconsideringRecognition andthe Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue in U.S. Courts,
29 VA. J. INT'L L. 473, 483 (1989).
114. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 82; Fountain, supra note 113, at 483.
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Fountain, supra note 113, at 483.
116. Fountain, supra note 113, at 483.
117. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 80; Iran HandicraftCarpetExport Ctr., 655 F.
Supp. at 1276.
118. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 81-82, 85-87.
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Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily extended this doctrine when it applied it
to reject the claims that (1) Hong Kong should be given de facto recognition
as a foreign state, or (2) Hong Kong should be recognized as part of the
United Kingdom. 9
3. The Role of Economics
In Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, the dissent made several policy
arguments in support of de facto recognition of Hong Kong as sovereign for
the limited purposes of alienage jurisdiction. These were based upon Hong
1 However, the Court did not
Kong's economic status in the world market. 20
give much weight to the economic relationship between the United States
and Hong Kong in its analysis. 2 ' Instead, the Court deferred to the
executive branch and relied on the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 to
justify a perfunctory analysis of United States recognition of Hong Kong as
an autonomous economic entity. 22 Only Judge Altimari, in his dissent,
of the Court's opinion and the damage to
recognized the full implications
23
Hong Kong corporations. 1
From the beginning of British Rule, Hong Kong has been recognized
as an important trading center. 124 Today, Hong Kong has emerged as an
important economic and financial center, especially with regard to
American trade. 11 As a result of its trade and economic powers, the United
States recognizes Hong Kong as an autonomous foreign state with respect
to the making of treaties and international agreements." 6 The U.S. -Hong
Kong Policy Act of 1992 was enacted to insure that Hong Kong's return to
China on July 1, 1997 would not change this relationship.12 7 While the
Matimak Court dismissed the arguments for recognition based on
economics, the dissent realized that Hong Kong plays a critical role in

119. Id.
120. Id. at 79-88.
121. Id. at 79-80.
122. Id. at 81-82.
123. Id. at 88-90.
124. Jensen, supra note 103, at 168.
125. 22 U.S.C. § 5701 (1994); Jensen, supra note 103, at 184.
126. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 90. The dissent recognizes that Hong Kong is a

member of GATT, given most favored nation status by the United States, and a founding
member of the World Trade Organization among other things which should support
recognition for the purpose of alienage jurisdiction. Id.
127. Jensen, supra note 103, at 172.
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policies and global economic expansion. 28 This reason alone
alerted the Court that it needed to consider the serious
which a denial of alienage jurisdiction has in the scheme of
relations.
IV.

CASE ANALYSIS

A. Opinion of the Court
1. Precedent
The Court began its analysis with an attempt to define a state. 29 The
Matimak Court adopted the general rule articulated in Iran Handicraftand
Carpet Export Center v. Marjan InternationalCorp. ,130 which defines a
foreign state as one that is recognized by the executive branch of
government.' 3 ' The Court of Appeals was able to avoid any significant
inspection of executive actions that would indicate a recognition of Hong
Kong as a sovereign, or part of a sovereign state by relying on this principle
of deference to the executive branch.' 32 The Court's deference to the
executive branch of government was supported and reinforced by certain
sections of the recently enacted U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 19921' as
an indication of executive intent to not recognize Hong Kong as
sovereign. 34 However, while the Court treats the Policy Act as evidence
of executive intent, it is a product of the legislature. 13' Therefore, the Court
is in actuality deferring to Congress, and, in the Court's analysis, Congress
has no power to recognize foreign states. "I
All parties in Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily agreed that there had
13
been no formal recognition of Hong Kong as a sovereign state.
Therefore, when the district court raised the issue of jurisdiction, Matimak

128. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 92.
129. Id. at 79-82.
130. Id. at 79-80; see also Iran Handicraft Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan
Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988).
131. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 79.
132. Id.at 91.
133. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732 (1994).
134. Matimak Trading Co. 118 F.3d at 81-82.
135. Id.at 82.
136. Id.
137. Id.at 80.
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argued that Hong Kong should be granted de facto recognition as a foreign
state so that Hong Kong citizens may invoke alienage jurisdiction.' 38 The
Court interpreted de facto recognition to require acts that evidenced39
impending recognition by the executive branch as a fully sovereign state. 1
The Court reasoned that since Hong Kong was not going to become an
independent state as India did when Muraka v. Bachrack Bros. was
decided," 4 but merely be returned to China, Hong Kong did not fall within
the rule and could not be recognized as a de facto foreign state.''
Matimak's argument was rejected because of the Court's continued
deference to the power of the executive branch to recognize foreign
states.' 42 The Court determined that recognition, whether formal or de
facto, was a political question and, therefore, it was outside the realm of
1 As the Court correctly assumes, recognition is a political
judicial power. 43
tool of national governments.'44 However, this analysis45 is usually applied
to formal recognition rather than de facto recognition. 1
The Court also dismissed the argument that Hong Kong was part of the
United Kingdom. 1' First, the Court reasoned that the United Kingdom had
the right to determine who are its citizens. 147 Therefore, since it had not
conferred citizenship on its dependent territories, the sovereignty of the
United Kingdom did not extend to the residents of Hong Kong. 148 A second
reason for rejecting this argument was because Matimak was incorporated
under the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance of 1984, rather than the British
Companies Act of 1948, therefore, its connection to the British crown was
too attenuated to justify a finding of British citizenship. 4 9

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
141. Matimak Trading Co. 118 F.3d at 80.
142. Id. at 80.
143. Id.
144. Fountain, supra note 113, at 479.
145. Id. at 480.
146. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 85-86.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 86 (rejecting the Justice Department's argument that even though Hong Kong
corporations were governed by the Hong Kong Companies Act of 1948, because the ultimate
authority over the plaintiff is the British Crown, Matimak Trading Co. should be treated as
a subject of the sovereign United Kingdom for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)).
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Matimak is not the first Hong Kong corporation to confront the issue
15
In Weindart Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics
of alienage jurisdiction."
Ltd., it was determined that Hong Kong was not a foreign state because the
executive branch considered Hong Kong a colony of the United
Kingdom.' 5 ' Therefore, the Weindart Court refused to grant Weindart
Watch Co. alienage jurisdiction.5 2 However, contrary precedent exists. 153
In Tetra Finance (HK)Ltd. v. Shaeen, the District Court found that it could
hear claims brought by two Hong Kong corporations despite the fact that
Hong Kong was not formally recognized as a foreign state under alienage
jurisdiction according to § 1332(a)(2). 54 Here, while alienage jurisdiction
was sustained because of one party's British citizenship, the Court stated
that it was extremely technical to preclude a Hong Kong corporation from
asserting claims in federal court simply because it lacks formal recognition
by the United States government.1 55 Therefore, the Court stated that it
would have granted alienage jurisdiction even if neither party had British
citizenship. 6 The Court in Tetra Financerelied on the fact that the United
States was the largest investor and trading partner in Hong Kong1 57 to
reinforce the point that the commercial realities of modern society dictate
that alienage jurisdiction should be granted to foreign entities even if they
have not been formally recognized. 58 This is the approach that the Second
Circuit should have followed in analyzing alienage jurisdiction instead of
relying on extremely formalistic notions of deference1 and
international law
59
that have no practical application in modern society.
2. Policy Considerations
In a single paragraph of its opinion, the Court in Matimak Trading Co.
v. Khalily declared that Hong Kong was stateless, and that a stateless

150.
1979);
151.
152.

See Weindart Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y.
Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaeen, 584 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Weindart Watch Co., 468 F. Supp. at 1245.
Id. at 1246.

153. Tetra Finance (HK)Ltd., 584 F. Supp. at 849.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 848.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 88-92, (2d. Cir. 1997) (Altimari,

J., Dissenting).

450

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. !8

corporation could not invoke alienage jurisdiction to sue a United States
The Court of Appeals advocated an abstract policy of
citizen. '1
statelessness which it derived from principles of international law, but the
Court never enumerated the criteria used to define statelessness. 6' Since
the Second Circuit refused to grant Hong Kong citizens alienage jurisdiction
by recognizing Hong Kong as sovereign, or as part of a sovereign state such
as the United Kingdom or China, it concluded that Hong Kong and its
citizens must be stateless. 62 This conclusion is obscure because, in the
interest of fairness, a corporation which has the right to enter into
agreements with United States citizens should have the right to sue for a
breach of those agreements in our federal courts.
The closest definition that can be found for the term "statelessness" is
that a stateless person is one who does not have the citizenship of any state
or is a citizen of a foreign entity that is not formally recognized by the
United States government.' 63 Statelessness is not considered a desirable
policy, especially in terms of individuals, because it places stateless persons
in an inferior position. '" There are several reasons for this result. 65 First,
it creates problems, both domestically and internationally, when the citizens
expect the privileges and responsibilities of full citizenship status but cannot
receive them. 66 In Matimak's situation, the company had been treated as
a full citizen in all of its business affairs and had thus expected that
treatment. 167 However, as a result of the Court's decision, Matimak was
denied the benefits of its treatment as a full citizen when it was not allowed
to sue trading partners for a breach of contract.1 68 Second, statelessness
reduces the social value of the citizens. 169 This reason could cause Matimak
to now be viewed as having less bargaining power in its trade relationships
since it is deprived of the power to enforce its international trade

160. Id. at 86.
161. Id.

162. Id.
163. Biancheria, supra note 65, at 197 n.3.
164. Id. at 200.

165. Id.
166. Id. (relying on

CATHRYN SECKLER-HUDSON,

REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES

STATELESSNESS:

WITH SPECIAL

253 (1934)).

167. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir. 1997) (Altimari, J.,

Dissenting).
168. Id. at 78-88.
169. Biancheria, supra note 65, at 200.
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agreements.' 70 In this situation, American trading partners are allowed to
force their will on Matimak since the consequences will be limited. 7' This
author does not believe that the Second Circuit intended to place Hong
Kong corporations in an inferior position when it deemed Hong Kong
stateless. Rather, it is one consequence that the Court neglected to consider
when it chose the policy of statelessness over granting alienage jurisdiction
to Hong Kong citizens.
B. The Dissent
1. Precedent
Judge Altimari's dissent takes the position that a failure to recognize
Hong Kong as a foreign state or its citizens as citizens or subjects of the
United Kingdom is contrary to the purposes of alienage jurisdiction. 172
Judge Altimari argues that the Court's decision in Matimak Trading Co. v.
Khalily risks antagonizing two important world forces, the United Kingdom
and China. 173 This is exactly what the framers sought to avoid when they
granted alienage jurisdiction to the federal courts. 174 Judge Altimari used
this basis to make a strong argument for recognition of Hong Kong as part
of the United Kingdom and for the Court to grant Matimak alienage
jurisdiction as a result. 175 This opinion is supported by examples from cases
in which other British dependent territories were granted alienage
jurisdiction because the Court found that the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom was applicable to the territory. 176 The dissent relied upon two
primary cases recognizing Bermuda and the Channel Islands as part of the
United Kingdom. 7 7 In both Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. Ltd. v.
Madias and Cedec Trading Co. Ltd. v. United American Coal Sales, Inc.,

170. Id.; Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88.
171. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 91-92.
176. Id. at 91 (quoting Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. Ltd. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731
(2d Cir. 1983); Cedec Trading Ltd. v. United Am. Coal Sales, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 722
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)). The dissent recognizes that there are many additional cases addressing
the issue of recognizing British Dependent territories as part of the United Kingdom for the
purposes of granting them alienage jurisdiction. Id.
177. Id.
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the Courts recognized that British dependent territories were7 part of the
United Kingdom even though they were not fully integrated. 1
This precedent, combined with the participation of the United Kingdom
and Hong Kong as a unitary force in international conferences and treaties,
provides an adequate basis for granting Hong Kong citizens alienage
jurisdiction as part of the United Kingdom. 179 Further support for this
argument is found in the very nature of the colonial relationship that existed
between the United Kingdom and Hong Kong at the time the suit was
commenced.'
While Hong Kong had its own colonial government that
made laws and handled problems pertinent to the needs of Hong Kong
citizens, the ultimate authority rested with the Queen of England. ' 8 This
stems from her former power to appoint the Governor of Hong Kong and
approve all laws enacted through the colonial government. 82 Some
commentators considered the United Kingdom's legal authority over Hong
Kong as limited and, therefore, not a full right of sovereignty. 83 However,
proponents of this theory find that the only limit is that the United Kingdom
had to relinquish its sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. ,8 Up
to that point, the Queen of England had complete authority to exert the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom over Hong Kong. 8
The dissent also argues that even if the Court was unwilling to accept
the idea that Hong Kong is part of the United Kingdom, it should grant
alienage jurisdiction based upon recognition of Hong Kong as a de facto
state. 6 This argument is based upon two theories. 87
' One theory relies on
the fact that the United States recognizes Hong Kong as autonomous with

178. Id.

179. Id. at 91-92 (utilizing Hong Kong's participation in the International
Telecommunications Union and International Labor Organization as examples where Hong
Kong is internationally recognized as part of the United Kingdom).
180. Id.at 91.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Jensen, supra note 103, at 169 (relying on a theory articulated by
AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (1987)).
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184. Id.
185. Id.; Matimak Trading Co. 118 F.3d at 90 (supporting the proposition that since the

United Kingdom and China speak of a transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong, the
implication is that each nation intends to exert its sovereignty over the citizens of Hong
Kong which provides a basis for granting alienage jurisdiction to Matimak Trading Co.).
186. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 90.

187. Id.at 89-90.
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regard to trade matters. 188 The other premise is that the United States
should not rely on another states' definition of who is a citizen of a
sovereign nation. 8 9 Some scholars have articulated interpretations of de
facto recognition that are not as narrowly defined as the one applied by the
Matimak Court. " One broader interpretation is to recognize states that are
not sovereign but whose citizens are sufficiently independent of the
sovereign. 19' This definition could easily include Hong Kong and therefore
allow Matimak to maintain its suit in federal court. " The United States
clearly recognized Hong Kong as sufficiently independent of its colonial
government.193 The United States has declared that, after July 1, 1997, it
will continue to view Hong Kong as sufficiently independent of the Chinese
government. ' Both of these factors provide an adequate basis for the court
to grant Matimak alienage jurisdiction. 195 It is unjust for the United States
to recognize foreign entities as autonomous in some respects and then deny
them access to the Courts because they do not enjoy full autonomy. At the
very least, these foreign entities should be recognized as part of the
sovereign nation that has control over them.' 96 The Matimak decision
subjects Hong Kong to very inconsistent treatment by the United States
because Hong Kong is considered as sufficiently autonomous by one branch
of the United States government but not another. 19
2. Policy Considerations
The dissent attacks the Court's notion of statelessness. 19 Judge
Altimari adopts the Court's premise that statelessness was not contemplated
by the framers' 99 but reaches the opposite conclusion. 2° He argues that
because of this very reason, the framers intended that every foreign citizen
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.at 90-91.
Id. at 89-91.
See, e.g., Fountain, supra note 113, at 480.
Biancheria, supra note 65, at 227.
Id.at 228 n. 179.
Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 81-82; 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 5701 (1994).
Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88-92.
Id.at 89-91.
Id.
Id.at 89.
Id. at 87-89.
Id.
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should be allowed to invoke alienage jurisdiction. 201 When citizens are
determined to be stateless, many argue that the drafters thought they had
included all people who were not American citizens under the grant of
alienage jurisdiction.20 2 Under this view, Matimak would have to be
granted alienage jurisdiction whether or not they were a sovereign state or
integrated into a sovereign nation.20 3 The only limits that were placed on
the grant of alienage jurisdiction were effected by the modern courts who
manipulated the notion of statelessness to exclude certain persons from
using our nation's courts. 20 4 To further its attack on the Court's reliance
upon the notion of statelessness, the dissent termed a stateless corporation
an "oxymoron" 20 5 because a corporation, unlike a natural person, must be
created by a state. 2° Therefore, whether Matimak Trading Co. is viewed
as being a corporation of Hong Kong or of the United Kingdom, it was
created by a state and should be recognized as such, rather than being
classified as stateless.2'
The dissent continued to refute the majority opinion, especially its
adherence to the policy of deference to the executive branch. 20 This was
done by finding that the executive branch had evidenced its intent to allow
Hong Kong citizens to sue in federal courts through the letter submitted by
the State Department on Matimak's behalf. 2°9 Furthermore, the dissent
recognized that although political and economic considerations are outside
the realm of the Judiciary, the strong economic link between the United
States and Hong Kong played a role in deciding the issue of alienage
jurisdiction. 21°
The dissent correctly pointed out that the majority
completely disregarded the widespread recognition of Hong Kong as a
limited autonomous force in order to justify a denial of alienage
jurisdiction. 211 Judge Altimari found that based upon the facts, all the

201. Id. at 89 (indicating that this would allow citizens of Hong Kong to sue American
citizens by invoking alienage jurisdiction).
202. Biancheria, supra note 65, at 206.
203. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 89.
204. Biancheria, supra note 65, at 206.
205. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 89.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 91.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 90 (relying on the fact that Hong Kong is a founding member of the World
Trade Organization, a member of many multilateral economic organizations and supports
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surrounding factors, and the Executive branch's intent to extend access to
the federal courts to Hong Kong citizens, Matimak's claim should not have
been dismissed.21 2
C. Future Implications
1. Damage to Hong Kong
Hong Kong has received unfair treatment by the United States
judiciary. 213 Hong Kong's important status in the world economy 214 allows
it to enter into agreements and contracts with sovereign nations and their
citizens. 215 However, as a result of Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, Hong
Kong citizens, whether individuals or corporations, are unable to obtain an
adequate remedy in the United States. 2 16 This results in inherent unfairness.
As the twelfth largest trading partner of the United States,217 Hong Kong
now faces great uncertainty in its dealings with the United States. 21 The
Court in Matimak states that Hong Kong corporations may still sue in state
courts. 219 However, it has already been noted that a federal forum is far
superior than the state forum. 22° This is because the federal courts are
perceived as: (1) less susceptible to democratic influences and bias against
foreigners, (2) more prepared to decide cases involving foreign relations
issues, and (3) facilitating the use of the Courts by foreigners by providing
a uniform system of procedure.22' In addition, the notion that a narrow
interpretation of alienage jurisdiction may result in adverse trade
consequences in today's global economy applies here. 222 As a result of
Matimak, Hong Kong now lacks any adequate legal remedy in the United

a multilateral trading system).
212. Id. at 90.
213. Id. at 92 (stating that access to our federal courts is justified without exceeding
judicial authority).
214. Id. at 81-82, 90.
215. Id. at 90; see generally Jensen, supra note 103.
216. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 78-88.
217. Id. at 81.
218. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 48.
219. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88.
220. See generally Johnson, supra note 14.
221. Id. at 6-15.
222. Id. at 48-49.
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States, which is an impediment to open trade dealings between Hong Kong
and United States corporations.223
2. Potential for Change
The dissent in Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily labeled the Court's
decision a "death knell for Hong Kong corporations seeking access to our
federal courts under alienage jurisdiction." 224 The majority implied that
Hong Kong corporations will continue to be denied access to federal courts
after its return to China on July 1, 1997.22 The reason for this is that the
Court does not believe that Hong Kong can be considered part of China if
it is not fully integrated, just as it did not consider Hong Kong to be
included under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.226 However, the
Court ignores the fact that China will have the ultimate sovereign authority
over Hong Kong after the handover.227 The dissent notes that after the
reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, the citizenship of Hong Kong will
be determined by Chinese law. 228 This demonstrates that Hong Kong
corporations are citizens of a sovereign and should be granted alienage
jurisdiction after July 1, 1997, if not before.229
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court employed an overly formalistic analysis in order to reject
claims by a Hong Kong corporation that it should be granted alienage
jurisdiction. 2 0 Therefore, the Court disregarded the intent of the
constitutional framers in order to adhere to vague notions of international
" ' The power to hear cases arising
law that the Court never clearly defined.23
between citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects of foreign
states was granted to federal courts to avoid the perception of unfair
treatment of foreigners in the United States judicial system.232 This
223. Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 88.
224. Id. at 88.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 82.
Id.
Jensen, supra note 103, at 170-71.
Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 90.

229. Id.
230. See generally Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d 76.

231. Id. at 89-90.
232. Id. at 87-88; Hong Kong Deposit and Guar. Co. Ltd. v. Hibdon, 602 F. Supp.
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principle was not given credit by the Second Circuit. The Court actually
created the perception of unfairness when it denied Hong Kong citizens
access to our federal courts. Hong Kong is now at a disadvantage in its
trade dealings with American corporations. 233 This opinion creates exactly
the sort of entanglement that the framers of the Constitution sought to
avoid.23 4 Furthermore, since the Court relied on the policy of statelessness,
it should have considered the implications and the damage that adherence
to this policy would create for all citizens of Hong Kong, especially
Matimak Trading Company.
Jennifer L. CovieIlo
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